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Smoothing Income against Crop Flood Losses in Amazonia: 
Rain Forest or Rivers as a Safety Net? 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the role of ex post labor supply in smoothing income in 
response to crop losses caused by large floods among riverine households in the Peruvian 
Amazon, where rich environmental endowments permit a variety of resource extractive 
activities and coping responses.  The paper finds that households respond to crop losses 
primarily by intensifying fishing effort not by relying on gathering of non-timber forest 
products, hunting, or asset liquidation.  This ex post labor adjustment helps to smooth 
total income against small crop losses but less well against large crop losses.  Both 
relatively non-poor households with better fishing capital and poor young households 




1.  Introduction 
Critical economic and environmental outcomes in developing countries depend on 
the capacity of the rural poor to cope with episodic shocks. Under extreme conditions – 
as during major droughts in semi-arid areas of Asia and Africa – poor rural households 
may choose to smooth assets (e.g., maintain livestock holdings) rather than to smooth 
food consumption (Lybbert et al., 2004; McPeak, 2004; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003), 
seeking to avoid future chronic poverty that might accompany sale of livestock to pay for 
normal food consumption levels (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993).  Such stark risk coping 
responses as partial starvation result, in part, from the lack of options that poor 
households might use in other instances, such as ex post labor adjustments (Cameron and 
Worswick, 2003; Kochar, 1999; Rose, 2001), loans or gifts from family or friends 
(Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Udry, 1994), or non-productive asset disposition (Udry, 
1995).  Whereas heterogeneity of risk coping strategies locally and globally reflect 
distinctive asset-activity portfolios (Dercon, 1998; Hoddinott, 2006), differential access 
to factor markets and social networks, and disparate family demographics, coping 
responses are also shaped by options afforded by surrounding environmental resources. 
Relatively little is known as yet of how the rural poor living in tropical rain 
forests cope with major shocks though forest and non-forest products are increasingly 
recognized as ‘safety nets’ for the forest peoples (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). Indeed, 
even though hurricanes, floods, and forest fires are significant episodic shocks in tropical 
rain forest, they are not as commonly studied for their effects on poor people as in other 
regions of the world.  This dearth of studies could be related to the perception that rain 
forest residents are less subject to harsh seasonal variations, have better potential access 
to multiple resources (land, non-timber forest products, timber, and often aquatic 3 
resources), and/or open access to forests and other natural resources, all of which might 
allow ex post labor adjustments (and hence more mutual insurance from social networks, 
too) to play a larger role in risk coping. An incipient literature is emerging on the role of 
the rain forest as “natural insurance” in which recent studies explore how access to 
multiple forest resources substitutes for or complements other forms of risk management 
for negative and positive income shocks (Delacote, 2007; Fisher and Shively, 2005; 
McSweeney, 2004; Pattanayak and Sills, 2001).  Several important questions though 
remain largely unanswered, specifically:  
-  What types of ex post labor adjustment strategies are pursued following 
episodic shocks? How are they combined with asset liquidation and other 
forms of risk coping? 
-  How do these strategies vary with wealth and other household factors? 
-  How effective are tropical forest households in coping with major shocks? 
-  What types of impacts might their risk coping strategies have on future 
economic and environmental outcomes in areas of high biodiversity?   
This paper seeks to explore the first three questions and to reflect on the fourth by 
focusing on the role of forest and riverine resources in the risk coping strategies of 
Amazonian peasant households living on the edge of the Pacaya Samiria National 
Reserve in Peru.  The paper exploits household data from a year when the region was hit 
by an early major flood that devastated agricultural floodplain crops.  Particular attention 
in the paper is given to the role of ex post labor adjustments to a major covariate shock, to 
integrated analysis of other risk coping approaches (especially asset disposition), and to 4 
key endogeneity issues that arise when linking shock outcomes to crop losses and 
subsequent responses.   
After a summary description in Section 2 of livelihood strategies of the 
respondent households, we focus in Section 3 on exploring how ex post transitory labor 
income contributes to the smoothing of total income, using the direct measure of crop 
losses caused by floods.  Because land type is so closely tied with crop choice, we seek to 
control for the potential endogeneity of cropping strategies and shocks.  Other 
endogeneity issues are considered and attended to via key control variables in the income 
regression. We find a level of compensation for negative income shocks offered by ex 
post non-farm income that is comparable with previous findings elsewhere, and 
specifically that total income is relatively smoothed against small crop losses but not 
against large crop losses.  Distinct from rural households in more arid regions, poor 
households in this tropical rain forest environment do earn significant levels of permanent 
non-farm income – both before and after the shock – through participation in a variety of 
resource extractive activities, such as fishing and to a lesser extent gathering of non-
timber forest products (NTFPs).   
Section 4 explores sources of heterogeneity in households’ coping strategies. The 
analysis of ex post labor supply of Section 3 is extended to incorporate dissavings 
behavior and to examine households’ decisions to adopt these coping strategies 
independently and jointly, using separate and joint Probit estimations.  Among our key 
findings – in contrast to previous studies – is that fishing rather than forest product 
gathering is employed as the main ex post coping strategy by two types of households – 
by households with greater fishing capital as well as by poor young households with a 5 
physical labor advantage.  Natural insurance, however, proves to be insufficient to 
compensate for major crop losses; differences in the capacity of households to use this 
coping strategy is strongly shaped by their asset endowments and demographic 
characteristics.  The conclusion discusses the implications for poverty alleviation and 
environmental conservation in tropical forests. 
2.  Livelihood Activities in Amazonian Lowland 
This study is based on household survey data gathered from traditional mestizo 
peasants (known locally as ribereños) in four villages located on the Marañón River, one 
of the primary Andean tributaries of the Amazon River in Peru.  All four villages are 
located in or around the Pacaya-Samiria National Reserve, one of the largest protected 
areas in the Amazon.  The Reserve encompasses over two million hectares of wetland 
and is dominated by seasonally or permanently inundated forest (Bayley et al., 1991; 
Rodríguez et al., 1995).  Each year the river rises and falls over a range of 8-10 metres, 
demarcating the seasons and shaping household livelihood activities.  The loss of crops 
due to occasional early, high and long-duration floods represents one of the biggest 
production shocks among rural households in the region and downstream in Brazil.  Our 
study focuses on a destructive flood that occurred in 1993.   
Flood vulnerability varies across land types: upland is never flooded, high levee is 
flooded only by high floods in some years (e.g., 1993), low levee and backslope are 
flooded each year, and mudflats and sandbars appear only for a limited time during the 
low-water season.
1  Correspondingly, land types determine agricultural strategies and 
crop choices, especially given the very rudimentary technologies used by farmers in the 
region (no mechanized equipment or animal traction and very limited purchased inputs) 6 
(Figure 1).  In upland agroforestry, plantain and manioc (main food crops) are planted 
first, followed by tree crops; at any moment in the crop rotation the plot may be left in 
fallow.  Lowland agroforestry sequences on the high and low levees depend on soil 
conditions determined by the annual flood; manioc (as well as maize to a lesser extent) is 
cropped annually, whereas plantain (a perennial) may be harvested over several seasons.  
On the levee backslope, farmers annually crop manioc (and maize and watermelon to a 
lesser extent), while on the mudflats and sandbars, they grow rice and cowpea, 
respectively, during the limited low-water period.   
A typical household portfolio includes food crops on low levee and backslope – 
which are locally abundant – along with a combination of cash crops (especially rice) on 
fertile mudflats and/or food crops on secure upland and relatively secure high levee – 
both of which are locally scarce (sandbars which are also scarce are considered as a 
secondary land).  Land clearing is a highly laborious task, undertaken only with machetes 
and axes, and is done by household and communal labor.  Once cleared, land is held by 
usufruct (i.e., without title), privately used, and transferred principally along kin group 
lines (land markets are absent).  As shown in Table 1, upland, high levee, low 
levee/backslope, mudflats, and sandbars constitute 25%, 30%, 20%, 21%, and 5% shares, 
respectively, of the mean land portfolio in our sample.  Rice, plantain, and manioc are 
three major crops cultivated by households in our sample; they are produced by a one-
half, two-thirds, and 84% of households and account for 42%, 23% and 13% of crop 
income, respectively.  Our data do not allow us to distinguish between no participation 
and complete crop failure – it is possible that some apparent ‘non-producers’ factually 
experienced complete failure of one or more crops.               7 
Local residents extract a variety of forest and aquatic products which are 
essentially open access resources near their community.  Most households participate in 
subsistence fishing with rudimentary equipment (hook and line, small gillnets, spears, 
canoes, etc.), while more commercially-oriented fishers employ boats with engines and 
larger, more sophisticated fishing nets.  All fishing capital is privately owned.  As in 
other developing regions, shared labor arrangements are common with commercially-
oriented fishermen.  Households poor in fishing capital may work with owners of large 
nets, boats and/or engine in exchange for a share of the catch.  Some households 
participate in NTFP gathering (e.g., palm fruit and heart of palm), hunting, and aquatic 
extraction (e.g., turtle, freshwater shrimp, aquarium fish), where labor is the only physical 
input required (hunting involves shotguns).  Wage labor opportunities are scarce and 
quite seasonal, typically limited to floodplain rice harvesting.  Overall, non-farm income 
from extractive activities is more significant than in many other developing rural areas; 
average household shares of income from agriculture, fishing, and other extractive 
activities are 52%, 32% and 16%, respectively (Table 1).
2     
3.  Crop Losses and Income Smoothing 
Survey respondents were asked to describe how they were affected by and 
responded to major floods in an open-ended question.
3  While floods are covariate 
shocks, household-level variations in land type, land quality, and hence crop choice make 
the resulting production shocks quite distinct across households.  Careful interpretation of 
this qualitative information allows us to differentiate three levels of shocks household i 
experienced in the large flood year of 1993 – no crop loss, small crop loss, and large crop 
loss – captured by shock dummy variables, Z0i, Z1i, and Z2i, respectively.  In our sample, 8 
18%, 60%, and 22% of households experienced no, small, and large crop losses, 
respectively (Table 1).  As the magnitude of crop losses is also determined by the area of 
lowland that was flooded – all land types but upland denoted by Li –, the shock dummy 
variables interacted with Li serve as our measures for crop losses, Zi = (Z1i*Li, Z2i*Li) 
with no crop loss as a base case (Cameron and Worswick, 2003 use similar crop loss 
measures).   
Even though flood shocks are exogenous, household-level crop losses caused by 
floods are usually not, as unobservable factors like ex ante crop choice, land quality, and 
farming skills, which determine crop losses, are potentially correlated with outcome 
variables – income and coping strategy – in our regression models.  Lacking panel data 
and options for valid instruments, we control for these unobservable factors in the 
following manner.  First, because major crop choice is tightly linked to the heterogeneity 
in land quality that occurs across land types, we use the size of each type of land owned 
(Ai) as a regressor to control for unobservable crop choice and land quality across land 
types.  We use land owned rather than land operated to avoid additional potential 
endogeneity problems associated with fallowing decisions.  Second, a dummy variable 
for high social status – leaders in kin groups or community groups (Si) – is used as a 
proxy for unobservable skills as it captures the household’s ability to mobilize communal 
labor for land clearing.  Next, to control for unobservable land quality within each land 
type, an interaction term is added, i.e., of each of three scarce lands – upland, high levee, 
and mudflats – with the social status dummy (AiSi).  Our implicit assumption is that 
socially well-positioned households are more likely to secure high quality land in each 9 
type.  Minor crop choice variation within each land type is assumed to be mainly shaped 
by within-type land quality.    
The analysis begins with an examination of how well our shock measure Zi 
captures crop losses caused by floods.  The following equation estimates the determinants 
of crop income yi: 
       i i i i i i i i X S A S A Z y ε β β β β α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 ,     (1) 
where Xi represents other household characteristics than those in Ai, Si, and AiSi that 
determine the level and variance of household permanent income.  Specifically, Xi 
consists of a dummy variable for large fishing nets owned (a major productive asset for 
non-farm activities), age and squared age of the household head (which capture lifecycle 
effects) – almost all heads are male in our sample – and numbers of adults and children.  
The regressors also include village dummy variables that capture covariate shocks and all 
village characteristics that shape a household’s permanent income.
4  It is hypothesized 
that crop income negatively responds to transitory idiosyncratic shocks Zi.  If the two 
crop loss variables adversely affect crop income in different magnitudes, then we expect 
that |α1| < |α2|, where αj is the estimated coefficient of ZjL.     
Ordinary least-squares estimates (OLS) of (1) are presented in column (1) of 
Table 2.  The coefficients on small and large shocks are negative and statistically 
significant; the latter is significantly larger than the former in magnitude (1.75 times).  An 
additional hectare of lowland with small and large shocks, respectively, gives rise to a 
loss of 11% and 19% of predicted crop income with no shocks (Z1L = Z2L = 0) evaluated 
at mean values for the other explanatory variables.  All estimated coefficients of land 
variables are positive, and those of high levee, low levee/backslope, and mudflats are 10 
statistically significant.  Insignificant results for upland and sandbars are probably due to 
their limited holdings among our sample households (only one village is located on 
upland and sandbars are a minor land type).  The marginal returns of upland and mudflats 
are positively affected by social status (neither of these interaction terms is statistically 
significant though).  Within-land heterogeneity on upland and mudflats is economically 
important for the following reasons.  Clearing upland forests is more demanding than 
lowland forests due to longer fallow and greater distances to clearing sites with larger 
fallow lands in upland agroforestry.  The quality of mudflats varies significantly as soil 
conditions are determined by annual sediment deposition, and the acquisition of new 
mudflats involves coordination among villagers.  In contrast, our results indicate that 
within-land heterogeneity is not significant on high levees.   
The marginal returns of different land types are consistent with common views as 
discussed above.  In particular, mudflats – especially high-quality mudflats held by those 
with a high social status – are the most fertile, followed by sandbars (another alluvium 
land), high levee, and low levee/backslope.  Upland with considerable fallow lands – 
especially low-quality upland held by those without a high social status – is the least 
fertile.  The dummy for large fishing nets has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on crop income.  This reflects the fact that large fishing net holdings are positively 
correlated with holdings of boats and/or engines which are used to transport agricultural 
produce to local markets.  
To further explore the performance of the shock measure, a similar estimation is 
done for each of the three major crops – rice, plantain, and manioc – as distinct cropping 
practices can beget differential vulnerability to large floods.  Rice is cultivated on fertile 11 
mudflats which appear only for a limited time during the low-water season.  Depending 
on the timing and speed of the rise in water-levels, rice plants can be seriously destroyed 
before the harvest even when the magnitude of flooding is not large (Chibnik, 1994).  
Although plantain (a perennial) tends to be cultivated on higher land than manioc in order 
to survive normal annual flooding, periodic high and long-duration floods can inundate 
the plant stem of the plantain over an extended period, causing massive destruction of the 
plants (Bergman, 1980).  Manioc, a root crop, by contrast, is more resistant to flooding, 
and can also be harvested as flood waters rise or after they fall.  Thus, ‘unexpected’ crop 
loss due to a severe flood is anticipated to be greater for rice and plantain than for 
manioc.   
Because the dependent variable – income from each crop – is censored at zero, a 
Tobit model is employed.  Two marginal effects of the adverse shocks holding all 
explanatory variables at mean levels are calculated: one based on the expected values of 
the dependent variable conditional on being uncensored, and the other based on the 
unconditional expected values of the dependent variable.  As the former applies when no-
production means non-participation and the latter applies when no-production means 
complete crop failure, the two measures serve as lower and upper bounds of true 
marginal effects in magnitude, respectively.   
The conjecture about differential vulnerability of the three major crops is 
confirmed by the results presented in Table 2, columns (2)-(4).  The overall fitness of the 
model for food crop – plantain and manioc, especially the latter – is weak.  Yet, all of the 
estimated coefficients of small and large shocks are negative in each crop equation.  Both 
small and large shocks significantly affect rice income (the marginal effects, respectively, 12 
are 11%-16% and 16%-22% of rice at means relative to no adverse shocks).  Only large 
shocks negatively affect plantain and manioc income in a statistically significant manner 
(a loss of 18%-25% of plantain and 11%-15% of manioc at means relative to no adverse 
shocks).  Together these three crops account for 63%-100% and 61%-86%, respectively, 
of total crop loss caused by small and large shocks.  These findings suggest that our 
shock variables effectively identify crop losses caused by floods.   
Following Rose (2001), our next step is to examine how these production shocks 
affect total household income.  A standard dynamic labor supply model (see Cameron 
and Worswick, 2003) suggests that we can directly apply equation (1) to total income.  
The OLS results are shown in column (5) of Table 2.  The estimated coefficients of small 
and large shocks are negative, but only the latter is statistically significant (the marginal 
effects are 4% and 11% of income at means relative to no adverse shocks, respectively).  
Their marginal effects are 57% and 85% of those in the crop income equation, 
respectively; that is, the overall effects of crop loss on total income are about 43% and 
15% less than it would have been had households not earned non-farm income in 
response to small and large shocks.  Therefore, income is better smoothed against the 
small shock than the large shock.   
We also consider an alternative aggregate shock index (Zai) which is defined, by 
using the estimated marginal effects of the shock variables in the crop equation, as 
follows: Zai = 0 if Z0i = 1 (no shock), Z1iLi if Z1i = 1 (small shock), and 1.75Z2iLi if Z2i = 1 
(large shock).  The OLS estimates of the crop equation and the Tobit estimates of the 
rice, plantain, and manioc equations using this shock index variable are presented in 
columns (1)-(4) of Table 3, respectively.  The estimated coefficients of the shock index 13 
variable are all negative and statistically significant.  Other values for the weighting of 
the large shock (between 1 and 3) were tried and all results are very similar to what is 
presented here.  As shown in the OLS estimates of the total income equation in column 
(5), non-farm income buffers 11% of income against crop losses measured by Zai on the 
margin.  While these estimates are comparable to those found by Rose (2001, 10-36% 
depending on rainfall shock measures), the degree of income smoothing attained after 
small shocks is higher than she found in rural India.  This difference is sensible given that 
in our sample non-farm income accounts for 48% of total income whereas the 
comparable figure in Rose (2001, p386) is only 12-16%.   
4.  Coping Strategies  
Qualitative information on the coping strategies of respondents following the 
1993 flood provides a direct measure of ex post labor adjustment.  Such information is 
different from ex post labor participation.  For example, even though most households 
fish for subsistence throughout the year, only certain households reported fishing as a 
coping strategy; this means that these households reported coping with the flood shock by 
increasing their labor allocation to fishing.  About half of the respondents adopted ex post 
labor adjustments, among which fishing and NTFP gathering were two common and non-
exclusive activities with adoption rates of 35% and 19%, respectively (Table 1).     
Although hunting and aquatic extraction are rewarding and critical extractive 
activities for some respondent households, virtually none reported using them as coping 
strategies.  This is probably explained by their specific skill requirements and yield risk, 
while fishing and NTFP gathering are more accessible to the broader population and less 
risky because of the abundant fish stocks in the region and the non-mobility of NTFPs.  14 
Distinct from other developing areas, very limited labor markets make wage labor a 
relatively uncommon coping strategy, with an adoption rate of only 8%.  In Table 1 ex 
post non-fishing labor adjustment combines NTFP gathering, wage labor, and hunting, 
which are almost mutually exclusive responses with a cumulative adoption rate of 28%.                       
About a quarter of respondents reported disposing of assets in response to flood 
shocks, principally small livestock (e.g., chickens) (13% adoption rate), food stock 
(especially manioc flour) (9%), and cash savings (4%), which were disposed of almost 
mutually exclusively.  No households reported disposing of large livestock such as cattle, 
buffalo and pigs or productive assets such as land and fishing capital.  These findings are 
consistent with those of many extant studies in other developing regions (e.g., Fafchamps 
et al., 1998; Udry, 1995).  Due to the relatively low propensity to dissave in each of the 
three forms of assets, we focus on aggregate dissaving behavior.
5
Standard dynamic labor supply and savings model suggests that we can use the 
same determinants as in equation (1) to estimate two separate regressions, one related to 
household i’s adoption of ex post labor and the other to its dissaving response (Pi):   
       ,     (2)  i i i i i i i
*
i X S A S A Z P ν δ δ δ δ γ + + + + + = 4 3 2 1
where P
*
i is the continuous latent variable associated with the outcome that household i 
increases ex post labor supply or dissavings (Pi = 1).  The coefficient γ is the product of 
the effect of adverse transitory shocks on transitory income (examined in the preceding 
section) and the effect of transitory income on ex post labor supply or dissavings.  If labor 
supply or dissavings is augmented in response to adverse shocks, then the coefficient 
estimate γ for that response should be positive.  δj is the product of the effect of all other 15 
explanatory variables on permanent income and the effect of permanent income on ex 
post labor supply or dissavings.         
The Probit estimates of the adoption of overall ex post labor adjustments, 
including the marginal effect of the adverse shock index Zai holding all explanatory 
variables at mean levels, are presented in column (1) of Table 4.
6  The estimated 
coefficient of the adverse shock is positive and statistically significant; its marginal effect 
is 12%.  Thus, an increase of one standard deviation in the adverse shock index (4.4) 
augments the probability of adjusting ex post labor supply by over 50%.  Households in 
our sample substantially augmented labor supply in response to crop losses.       
To examine how distinctive non-farming activities respond to crop losses, we 
estimate ex post fishing, non-fishing, and gathering labor adjustments (wage labor is too 
uncommon to conduct this analysis), and the results are shown, respectively, in columns 
(2)-(4) of Table 4.  In the fishing equation, the estimated coefficient of the crop loss 
variable is positive and statistically significant, and its marginal effect is 6%.  In the non-
fishing equation, the estimated coefficient of the crop loss is also positive but statistically 
insignificant with a small marginal effect (3%).  The estimation results of the gathering 
equation are similar to those of the non-fishing equation with an almost zero marginal 
effect of the adverse shock index.  Thus, while ex post gathering labor does not respond 
to crop losses, ex post fishing labor does in a significant manner.  As shown in column 
(5), dissavings behavior does not respond to crop losses, either.   
Why was gathering labor (a major component of non-fishing labor) unresponsive 
to crop losses even though gathering was a common coping strategy reported by 
respondents?  Our interpretation is that gathering is generally intensified during the high 16 
water season – in both normal and unusually large flood years – because remote palm 
stands become more accessible by canoe and hence collection is more productive.  Thus, 
some households may have augmented gathering in response to the flooding itself but not 
specifically to crop losses.  This hypothesis, however, cannot be tested with our data with 
limited variations in the magnitude of floods.  Contrarily, during the high-water season, 
fishing becomes less productive due to the dispersal of the fish stock in the floodplain 
forest.
7  Our finding that the fishing response to crop losses is common even under 
unfavorable conditions raises a question that is to be explored shortly: who could 
intensify ex post fishing?  The disposition of small livestock and food stock is also a 
common practice during the high-water season, and for that reason dissavings may not 
have responded specifically to crop losses.       
In the ex post fishing equation, the estimated coefficients of some of other 
explanatory variables are statistically significant in sensible ways.  The negative 
coefficients of all land variables and the social status dummy indicates the substitution 
between the two major livelihood activities, farming and fishing.  Large fishing net 
holdings have a positive impact as expected.  The effect of the age of household head 
takes an inverted-U shape and its marginal effect peaks at around 38 years of age (which 
is notably smaller than the mean, 46 years).  Fishing is preferred by young families with 
physical capacity for the labor involved.  On the other hand, we find very limited 
significant results on other explanatory variables in the non-fishing, gathering, and 
dissavings equations.    
To examine who intensified fishing in response to crop losses, we allow the 
marginal effects of the adverse shock to vary across households: 17 
       ,    (3)  i i i i i i i i i
*
i X S A S A B Z Z P ν δ δ δ δ γ γ + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 1
where Bi is factors which alter households’ response to adverse shocks in the form of 
labor supply or dissavings.  Based on our findings in the previous regressions, we include 
the fishing net dummy and the age of household head in Bi (the squared age of household 
head is dropped here as no significant non-linear relationship is found when it is added).     
The Probit estimates of equation (3) for the five coping strategies examined in 
Table 4 are presented in Table 5.  Most results are very similar to what is reported in 
Table 4, and the adverse shock index is jointly statistically significant only in the fishing 
equation.  A new key finding though is that households with large fishing nets and young 
households are more likely to adopt fishing in response to crop losses.  The marginal 
effects of the adverse shock index are estimated for young, middle, and old households 
with and without large fishing nets, where their ages are mean age minus one standard 
deviation, mean age, and mean age plus one standard deviation (33, 46, and 59 years), 
respectively.  The most critical factor that significantly alters the responsiveness of ex 
post fishing is fishing net holdings.  With large fishing nets, the marginal effects are in 
the range of 27% for households with age at means.  As such, an increase of one standard 
deviation in the adverse shock index augments the probability of the adoption of ex post 
fishing by almost 120%.  For young households, the marginal effects become even larger.  
Meanwhile, the marginal effects among those without large fishing nets are small and 
statistically insignificant except for young households (12%).  Hence, both relatively 
non-poor households with better fishing capital and poor young households with a 
physical advantage intensified fishing as a coping strategy, but poor older households did 
not.  No significant results are found for non-fishing, gathering, and dissavings responses.     18 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that coping strategies are independent of each 
other.  To see whether relaxing this assumption alters our findings, we jointly estimate 
the adoption of three coping strategies using the trivariate Probit model.  Two sets of 
three coping strategies are examined: fishing, non-fishing, and dissavings in the first set, 
and fishing, NTFP gathering, and dissavings in the second set.  The estimation results of 
equations (2) and (3) for the first and second sets are presented in columns (1)-(4) in 
Table 6, respectively.  The independence of the three coping equations is not rejected in 
any of these four models.
8  Indeed, all the estimated coefficients are very similar to what 
we found when we treat coping strategies as independent, which buttresses the robustness 
of our earlier findings.       
5.  Conclusion 
Our main findings are that riverine households in the Peruvian Amazon respond 
to crop losses due to floods primarily by intensifying fishing effort and this ex post labor 
adjustment helps smooth total income against small crop losses but does not fully smooth 
income against large crop losses.  Both relatively non-poor households with better fishing 
capital and poor young households with a physical advantage in doing hard labor are 
more likely to employ this form of natural insurance. 
The significant role of natural insurance found in this study underscores the 
importance of environmental conservation as a means to protect the poor against risk.  
Yet, different extractive activities can play quite distinctive roles as insurance.  In the 
Pacaya Samiria National Reserve, fishing is a major form of insurance against crop losses 
even though other extractive options, such as NTFP gathering, are also significant 
livelihood activities.  Unlike many other locales in the tropical rain forests, the primary 19 
environmental concerns in the Reserve are not deforestation and pasture formation, but 
species degradation and biodiversity loss caused by local resource extraction, especially 
hunting, aquatic extraction, and NTFP gathering.  Our findings suggest that the river, not 
the forest, matters most as the poor’s safety net in the Reserve, and that the natural 
insurance role of fishing does not significantly conflict with the major forest and wildlife 
conservation concerns.  However, households’ capacity to use the river’s resources as 
insurance depends on their endowments (fishing capital) and characteristics (age).  By 
subsidising fishing capital accumulation, for example, conservation groups could reduce 
both the vulnerability of poor households to adverse shocks and future reliance on fragile 
forest resources; clearly though attention to fishery management would be needed (see 
Bayley and Petrere, 1989).   
In tropical forests where aquatic options are nil or limited, households must rely 
more on terrestrial resources to cope with risk, which may exacerbate the downward 
spiral of poverty and environmental degradation, and their ex post behaviors may be quite 
heterogeneous.  In such a case, supporting alternative insurance options like savings and 
sustainable labor activities (e.g., wage labor out of forest or contingent employment 
opportunities) designed to reflect across-households heterogeneity may be called for to 
prevent vicious cycles of poverty and degradation.  Detailed empirical work is needed to 
investigate further the distinct roles and impacts of natural insurance of resource-reliant 
people in environmentally heterogeneous locales.   20 
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1 In Amazonia, ‘lowland’ refers generally to lands that are susceptible to flooding 
whereas ‘upland’ refers to terra firme (i.e., land that is never flooded).  Lowland soils 
along the Amazon and its Andean tributaries tend to be younger and significantly more 
fertile than upland soils.  Despite the development promise of the lowlands (Barrow, 
1985; Norgaard, 1981), economic research on lowland agriculture is surprisingly scant.   
2 The number of observations of income variables (n = 77) is smaller than that of other 
variables (n = 95) due to missing observations.  All income analyses are performed on the 
former sub-sample, and other analyses not requiring income data are conducted with the 
whole sample to increase the accuracy of estimation.   
3 In the case of rainfall shocks, the focus of many extant works in the literature, it is 
difficult to distinguish ex ante and ex post behaviors because low rainfall regimes are 
often experienced as cumulative effects.  Contrarily, we focus on floods, which occur in a 
specific identifiable period, allowing respondents and observers to identify ex post 
responses as well as shock magnitude. 
4 One village is located on upland in our sample.  While most households earned only ex 
ante crop income, some households in this upland village that could farm the plots which 
were not flooded earned ex post crop income after the shock.  Most of the ex post crop 
income can be considered as permanent income as all they could do is to harvest what 
was available on their plots. 
5 No households reported using credit or remittances, and the use of transfer as mutual 
insurance was very rare.  It seems that natural resource extraction options in the region 24 
 
allow households to rely less on those insurance options than are common in other rural 
areas.  The low frequency of mutual insurance in response to flood shocks is also 
consistent with the widely held notion that mutual insurance under covariate shocks is 
much less feasible than under idiosyncratic shocks.  Indeed, mutual insurance was a 
common coping strategy in response to idiosyncratic health shocks among households in 
our sample. 
6 The small and large shock variables cannot be used to estimate equation (2) because all 
households who experienced no shocks (Z0i = 1) neither adjusted ex post labor supply nor 
employed dissaving (i.e., perfect prediction of Pi = 0).   
7 The infrequency of hunting as a coping strategy even though its productivity is 
improved during the high-water season, when wildlife is concentrated on the reduced 
non-inundated lands and the access to hunting sites is improved, suggests the 
significantly high risk entailed in hunting.        
8 These insignificant results are mainly due to the limited degrees of freedom of our 
trivariate Probit model, which also makes its overall significance weak.  It is still noted 
that the estimated correlations of error terms between fishing and NTFP gathering in both 
equations (2) and (3) and those between fishing and dissavings in equation (3), which are 
positive and negative, respectively, have considerable magnitudes, while all other 
estimated correlations are very small.  Hence, unobservable factors like skills which 
affect ex post fishing is positively and negatively correlated with those which shape 
NTFP gathering and dissavings, respectively.  In particular, households with high fishing 
skills are more and less likely to intensify NTFP gathering and dissave, respectively.     
 25 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Land holdings (ha):
Upland 1.1 (1.9) 1.1 (1.7)
High levee 1.3 (2.1) 1.5 (2.3)
Low levee/backslope 0.9 (1.6) 0.9 (1.7)
Mudflat 0.9 (1.6) 1.1 (1.7)
Sandbar 0.2 (0.7) 0.2 (0.8)
Total lowland (L i) 3.3 (3.4) 3.7 (3.6)














Other extraction 797 (1658)
Total 4984 (4006)
Household characteristics:
Social status (0/1) 0.34 (0.48) 0.34 (0.48)
Large fishing nets owned (0/1) 0.31 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45)
Age of household head 46.1 (13.2) 45.3 (13.4)
Number of adults 3.5 (1.9) 3.5 (1.9)
Number of children 3.2 (2.1) 3.4 (2.1)
Adverse idiosyncratic shocks:
No shocks (0/1) (Z 0i) 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.40)
Small shocks (0/1) (Z 1i) 0.60 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49)
Large shocks (0/1) (Z 2i) 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41)
Small shocks*Lowland (Z 1iL i) 2.0 (3.3) 2.3 (3.6)
Large shocks*Lowland (Z 2iL i) 0.8 (2.1) 0.8 (2.3)
Adverse shock index (Z ai) 3.4 (4.4) 3.7 (4.8)
Overall ex post labor adjustment (0/1) 0.52 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50)
Fishing 0.35 (0.48) 0.31 (0.47)
Non-fishing 0.28 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44)
NTFP gathering 0.18 (0.39) 0.14 (0.35)
Wage labor 0.08 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29)
Hunting 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.19)
Overall dissaving (0/1) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
Livestock 0.13 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35)
Food stock 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.27)
Cash 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19)





(n = 77)26 
Table 2. The Determinants of Income - Small and Large Shocks. 
(n=77)
Small shocks -420 * -392 *** -136 -32 -240
(232) (144) (94) (27) (292)
Large shocks -730 *** -562 *** -319 *** -69 ** -620 **
(242) (161) (113) (32) (310)
Upland (ha) 14 -247 98 3.9 41
(185) (186) (116) (31) (274)
High levee (ha) 582 ** 435 ** 129 74 * 450
(278) (203) (141) (38) (374)
Low levee/backslope (ha) 449 * 163 265 ** 51 348
(249) (183) (126) (35) (316)
Mudflat (ha) 664 ** 764 *** 286 ** -1.2 602
(289) (207) (136) (39) (361)
Sandbar (ha) 622 -128 36 162 * 755
(483) (481) (351) (95) (793)
Social status (0/1) -140 -715 -64 107 1000
(725) (776) (455) (126) (1600)
Upland*Social status 290 318 37 -0.2 -78
(466) (458) (284) (81) (772)
High levee*Social status -98 279 62 -67 -220
(214) (239) (172) (47) (378)
Mudflat*Social status 295 239 102 14 -450
(273) (251) (180) (51) (473)
Large fishing nets owned (0/1) 1600 ** 146 525 28 1900 *
(638) (580) (364) (99) (997)
Age of household head (years) -30 -0.8 -19 1.1 -59
(106) (132) (89) (24) (189)
Squared age of household head (years
2) 0.35 -0.06 0.29 0.05 0.69
(1.2) (1.4) (1.0) (0.3) (1.9)
Number of adults 18 87 -43 25 25
(154) (124) (90) (25) (207)
Number of children 141 158 74 29 388 *
(132) (143) (98) (28) (217)
Sigma 1385 *** 1059 *** 308 ***
(168) (110) (28)
F (p-value) 0.00 0.00
Chi-squared (p-value) 0.00 0.16 0.48
R squared 0.60 0.33
Log-likelihood -341.9 -445.0 -475.5
α 1=α 2=0 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.09
α 1=α 2 (p-value) 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.08
Marginal effects at means:
Small shock (conditional means) -186 *** -58 -20
(66) (40) (17)
Small shock (unconditional means) -265 *** -82 -26
(94) (57) (22)
Large shock (conditional means) -266 *** -135 *** -43 **
(75) (48) (20)
Large shock (unconditional means) -380 *** -193 *** -58 **
(106) (69) (27)
Predicted income at means with no shocks 3826 1691 769 431 5739
(715) (415) (284) (81) (850)
Manioc
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) are OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses and columns 
(2)-(4) are tobit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  Other regressors which are not shown are 
village dummies and constant.  Sigma is the estimated standard deviation of the error term in the tobit 
model.  α 1 and α 2 are the estimated coefficients of small and large shocks, respectively.
*: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant at 1%.
Total 
income
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Total crop Rice Plantain27 
Table 3. The Determinants of Income - Shock Index. 
(n=77)
Adverse shock index (Z ai) -420 *** -314 *** -185 *** -40 ** -370 **
(129) (91) (64) (18) (175)
F (p-value) 0.00 0.00
Chi-squared (p-value) 0.00 0.13 0.43
R squared  0.60 0.33
Log-likelihood -342.2 -445.3 -475.6
Marginal effects of adverse shock at means:
Conditional means -150 *** -79 *** -25 **
(43) (27) (11)
Unconditional means -213 *** -112 *** -34 **
(61) (39) (15)
Predicted income at means with no shocks 3826 1532 874 420 6026
(544) (353) (241) (69) (734)
Manioc
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) are OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses and columns (2)-(4) 
are tobit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  Other regressors which are not shown are the same as 
those in Table 2.  
*: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant at 1%.
Total 
income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total crop Rice Plantain28 
(n=95)
Adverse shock index (Z ai) 0.30 ** 0.23 * 0.12 0.05 -0.05
(0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08)
Upland (ha) 0.08 -0.28 0.22 0.12 0.01
(0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.29) (0.15)
High levee (ha) -0.37 -0.30 -0.13 0.09 0.05
(0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.35) (0.17)
Low levee/backslope (ha) -0.34 -0.41 * -0.14 0.04 0.21
(0.23) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) (0.17)
Mudflat (ha) -0.44 * -0.42 -0.21 -0.74 0.36 **
(0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.53) (0.18)
Sandbar (ha) -0.15 -0.94 0.29 0.35 -0.16
(0.57) (0.58) (0.49) (0.73) (0.42)
Social status (0/1) -0.83 -0.71 -0.52 -0.89 0.69
(0.60) (0.52) (0.58) (0.67) (0.48)
Upland*Social status -0.24 0.11 0.09 0.73 * 0.32
(0.32) (0.31) (0.29) (0.39) (0.27)
High levee*Social status 0.45 0.36 0.03 -0.18 -0.03
(0.39) (0.25) (0.23) (0.31) (0.24)
Mudflat*Social status 0.57 -0.01 0.15 0.65 -0.27
(0.44) (0.31) (0.25) (0.50) (0.21)
Large fishing nets owned (0/1) 0.83 * 0.84 * -0.12 0.36 -0.12
(0.49) (0.46) (0.49) (0.59) (0.44)
Age of household head (years) 0.26 * 0.25 * 0.20 0.21 0.03
(0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11)
Squared age of household head (years
2) -0.004 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 -0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Number of adults -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Number of children 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 0.10
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Chi-squared (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.24
Pseud R squared 0.47 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.21
Log-likelihood -35.1 -40.1 -36.4 -27.7 -41.7
Marginal effects of adverse shock at means 0.30 ** 0.23 * 0.12 0.05 -0.05
(0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08)
Non-fishing




Notes: These are probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  Other regressors which are not shown are 
village dummies and constant. 
*: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant at 1%. 
Dissavings






Adverse shock index (Z ai) 0.46 1.20 ** -0.16 0.33 -0.31
(0.41) (0.53) (0.36) (0.48) (0.32)
Z ai*Large fishing nets owned (0/1) 0.18 0.41 * -0.16 -0.01 0.27 **
(0.17) (0.22) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13)
Z ai*Age of household head (years) -0.004 -0.020 * 0.006 -0.006 0.004
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Chi-squared (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11
Pseud R squared 0.48 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.27
Log-likelihood -34.5 -36.0 -35.7 -27.5 -38.6
Joint significance test for adverse shock (p-value): 0.17 0.06 0.43 0.91 0.16
Marginal effects of adverse shock:
Means 0.13 ** 0.09 ** 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
No large fishing nets; Young 0.12 * 0.12 ** 0.02 0.03 -0.05
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
No large fishing nets; Middle 0.10 ** 0.03 * 0.03 0.00 -0.03
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
No large fishing nets; Old 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Large fishing nets; Young 0.06 * 0.32 *** -0.05 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05)
Large fishing nets; Middle 0.14 ** 0.27 ** -0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.07) (0.11) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Large fishing nets; Old 0.16 ** 0.16 * 0.00 0.00 0.05
(0.08) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Notes: These are probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  Other regressors which are not shown are 
the same as those in Table 4.  The ages of young, middle, and old households, respectively, mean age minus one 
standard deviation, mean age, and mean age plus one standard deviation (33, 46, and 59 years).  All other 
variables which are not specified are held at mean levels in the estimation of marginal effects.
*: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant at 1%.
Dissavings









Equation 1 - Fishing:
Adverse shock index (Z ai) 0.22 * 1.25 ** 0.23 * 1.18 **
(0.12) (0.54) (0.12) (0.49)
Z ai*Large fishing nets owned 0.45 ** 0.40 *
(0.23) (0.20)
Z ai*Age of household head -0.02 * -0.02 **
(0.01) (0.01)
Equation 2 - Non-fishing/NTFP gathering:
Adverse shock index (Z ai) 0.12 -0.17 0.05 0.40
(0.10) (0.37) (0.14) (0.50)
Z ai*Large fishing nets owned -0.17 -0.01
(0.16) (0.17)
Z ai*Age of household head 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Equation 3 - Dissavings:
Adverse shock index (Z ai) -0.05 -0.24 -0.05 -0.24
(0.08) (0.31) (0.08) (0.31)
Z ai*Large fishing nets owned 0.28 ** 0.28 **
(0.13) (0.13)
Z ai*Age of household head 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Correlations of error terms (ρ kl):
ρ 12 0.09 0.15 0.49 * 0.41
(0.23) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26)
ρ 23 -0.12 0.05 -0.10 -0.03
(0.22) (0.25) (0.24) (0.26)
ρ 31 -0.14 -0.40 -0.11 -0.37
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25)
ρ 12=ρ 23=ρ 31=0 (p-value) 0.84 0.44 0.27 0.21
Chi-squared (p-value) 0.16 0.28 0.38 0.55
Log-likelihood -117.7 -109.0 -107.5 -99.9
Joint significance test for adverse shock (p-value):
Equation 1 0.05 0.05
Equation 2 0.42 0.87
Equation 3 0.15 0.15
Notes: These are trivaraite probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  Other regressors which are 
not shown are the same as those in Table 4.  ρ kl is the estimated correlation of error terms in equations k and 
l.
*: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant at 1%.


















Figure 1. Land Types and Crop Choice.
Upland Tree






Mudflat Sandbar  